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Abstract 
Livestock industries are vulnerable to disease threats, which can cost billions of dollars 
and have substantial negative social ramifications. Losses are mitigated through increased 
use of disease-related biosecurity practices, making increased biosecurity an industry 
goal. Currently, there is no industry-wide standard for sharing information about disease 
incidence or on-site biosecurity strategies, resulting in uncertainty regarding disease 
prevalence and biosecurity strategies employed by industry stakeholders. Using an 
experimental simulation game, we examined human participant’s willingness to invest in 
biosecurity when confronted with disease outbreak scenarios. We varied the scenarios by 
changing the information provided about 1) disease incidence and 2) biosecurity strategy 
or response by production facilities to the threat of disease. Here we show that 
willingness to invest in biosecurity increases with increased information about disease 
incidence, but decreases with increased information about biosecurity practices used by 
nearby facilities. Thus, the type or context of the uncertainty confronting the decision 
maker may be a major factor influencing behavior. Our findings suggest that policies and 
practices that encourage greater sharing of disease incidence information should have the 
greatest benefit for protecting herd health.  
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Introduction 
The U.S. livestock industry is vulnerable to disease threats (Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive HSPD-9), with the potential costs of a major epidemic estimated to 
be in the 10s to 100s of billions of dollars [1, 2]. Detection of a disease reportable to U.S. 
animal health authorities, such as Foot and Mouth Disease, could trigger international 
trade regulations and sanctions resulting in the immediate loss of international market 
demand for the affected sectors [1]. For example, the closure of swine export markets 
could result in losses of approximately $5B/yr [3, 4]. The effective mitigation of disease 
threats, through the right balance of information sharing and biosecurity protocol 
adoption, can help to reduce risk to individual producers, their production chains and 
industry wide. 
Animal livestock producers operate in a complex and uncertain social and 
environmental landscape in which information about disease and biosecurity is 
incomplete or kept confidential within small networks. Despite this lack of information, 
facility managers must make regular decisions regarding farm operations to attempt to 
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keep animals healthy. While disease spread has been examined, for example through the 
use of epidemiological models [5, 6], the influence of human behavior on animal health 
and the spread of disease remains under-examined. Few attempts have been made to 
quantify the complex factors that influence decisions by industry stakeholders, and 
moreover, how those decisions will impact the spread of disease [but see 7, 8-11].  
Biosecurity practice adoption can be expensive and include infrastructure 
development and upkeep, personnel training, and opportunity costs [12]. These costs are 
weighed against the perceived risk of contracting disease, and thus, adoption of 
biosecurity practices must be weighed against the economic return on investment. Yet, 
determining the bounds on economic return is challenging because biosecurity efficacy 
differs by disease, is dependent upon decisions of others, and importantly, is only 
necessary when confronted with disease. Moreover, non-economic factors influence 
stakeholder decisions to invest in biosecurity [13].  
Understanding the rationale behind biosecurity investment decisions requires an 
examination of economic ramifications as well as social dynamics, and the risk and 
uncertainty associated with the decisions. Risk perception in the agricultural sciences 
carries multiple meanings, such as 1) the probability of a known negative outcome (e.g., 
risk of loss) [14, 15], and 2) uncertainty of the occurrence of a negative outcome [16, 17]. 
Uncertainty aversion, the preference for selection of something with a known probability 
over an unknown probability, is behaviorally ubiquitous with rare exceptions [17]. 
Moreover, evidence suggests that the majority of individuals will pay a premium to 
reduce uncertainty [17]. Thus, as it pertains to investment in biosecurity, uncertainty 
aversion theory would suggest increased investment in biosecurity with increased 
uncertainty.  
One method of compartmentalizing uncertainty is by conceptualizing it as either 
environmental or social uncertainty (also referred to as strategic uncertainty) [18]. Social 
uncertainty can be defined as uncertainty related to human decisions, actions or 
strategies, such as uncertainty if an employee will come to work when they are sick. 
Environmental uncertainty is uncertainty that is not directly attributable to human 
decisions, actions or strategies, such as weather uncertainty or uncertainty associated with 
disease virulence. Messick, Allison, and Samuelson [18] suggest the fundamental 
distinction between response to environmental uncertainty and social uncertainty is that 
under environmental uncertainty, people are attempting to optimize their utility, i.e., 
when individuals make decisions in an environmentally uncertain arena, they simply 
weigh the pluses and minuses. In contrast, when confronted with social uncertainty, 
individuals are attempting to strategize based on the anticipated or realized behavior of 
others. Social uncertainty depends upon the beliefs each participant has about the 
strategies employed by other people or groups [19]. Loewenstein, Bazerman, and 
Thompson [20] provide evidence that the decision-making process under social 
uncertainty contrasts sharply with environmental uncertainty largely because of the 
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potential for social dispute. Others suggest that social uncertainty differs because it can 
be constrained by our experiences with human behavior and social norms. Overall, 
evidence suggests that social uncertainty is preferred over environmental uncertainty, 
implying that environmental uncertainty aversion is greater than to social uncertainty 
aversion [21, 22]. Typically, people will pay more to reduce environmental uncertainty 
than to reduce social uncertainty, perhaps because we can use previous experiences to 
better understand and conceptually reduce uncertainty. For example, we don’t know that 
our doctor is using best practices, but our experiences suggest that they are likely 
behaving well. For purposes of this study, a social entity’s response to the possibility of 
disease incursion (e.g., biosecurity practices) is labeled social uncertainty, whereas 
disease factors (e.g., contagion rate, disease hosts) are binned as environmental 
uncertainty.  We hypothesize that higher levels of environmental uncertainty and social 
uncertainty will be positively related to biosecurity investment. Specifically, as 
environmental and social uncertainty increase, we predict that participants will be willing 
to invest more in biosecurity practices to reduce the risk of infection, and thus pay a 
higher premium to reduce the risk of infection. Because social uncertainty is expected to 
generate less uncertainty aversion than environmental uncertainty, we hypothesize that 
increased uncertainty in disease incidence domain (e.g. environmental uncertainty) will 
have a larger effect on biosecurity investment than an equivalent increase in uncertainty 
in the biosecurity practice domain (social uncertainty).   
It has been well established that risk and uncertainty influence adoption of novel 
agricultural practices [23]. Moreover, Parker et al. [24] demonstrated that uncertainty 
exists in the animal food disease transmission domain because of the existence of 
numerous types of diseases, vectors of transmission, contagion, and virulence factors as 
well as the array of social or strategic responses to the uncertainty surrounding disease 
transmission.  
Currently, neither the U.S. government nor the livestock industry mandate or 
incentivize sharing of information about endemic disease incidence or prevalence of 
biosecurity practices among production-level stakeholders. Many stakeholders consider 
this information to be confidential, or a part of their trade secret. This lack of industry 
transparency results in uncertainty regarding the presence of disease threats, and thereby 
challenges the development of effective biosecurity strategies because it is unclear where 
weaknesses reside in the industry [25]. Broadly, we are interested in exploring the effect 
of interventions that would increase information sharing among stakeholders, and thus, 
provide insight to policy makers who seek to weigh the costs associated with investment 
in risk communication, public information campaigns and “early warning” systems [e.g., 
26].  
By deepening our understanding of the relationship between perceptions of 
environmental and social uncertainty and the inherent behavioral factors considered in 
light of these uncertainties, we may be able to identify and focus interventions, such as 
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risk communication systems, development of information sharing networks or policy 
interventions, and by doing so, foster improved biosecurity for livestock industries [27, 
28].  
Materials and Methods 
Overview 
We simulated swine industry dynamics with an eye towards understanding the 
effect of uncertainty on the willingness to increase investment in biosecurity. The swine 
industry was selected as the context for this study because the swine industry has 
experienced recent incursions of virulent diseases such as porcine respiratory and 
reproductive syndrome and porcine epidemic diarrhea virus [5] and biosecurity efforts 
across the swine industry sector are inconsistent, providing an opportunity to help guide 
behavior towards a more resilient system. Additionally, swine production stakeholders 
understand the need for improved system resilience and, mediated through workshops 
and focus groups, helped develop and ground truth our serious game design.  
Here we used a digital field experiment, or a “serious game” approach to examine 
behavior amidst environmental and social uncertainty in the swine industry. Serious 
games (as opposed to recreational games) are increasingly employed as research tools in 
studies of human behavior and decision-making [29]. Economic experiments, which are 
analogous to serious games, have been used for decades to better understand uncertainty 
and decision-making behaviors [16, 30, 31]. We paid participants using a performance-
based incentive strategy to increase salience and engagement by the participants [32]. 
Participants 
Participants were recruited via Craigslist, University listservs, direct emails, posters, and 
word of mouth. While participants ranged across the public spectrum, a majority were 
graduate and undergraduate students. All games were played at the University of 
Vermont, an R1 university in the northeastern U.S. Upon arrival, participants were given 
a written informational summary of the study and, because they were paid for their 
participation, asked to sign a payment authorization form.  
To minimize pre-game framing effects, all participants viewed the same pre-
recorded narrated slideshow, which provided an overview of the hog industry and 
explained game play and the cash payout. Participants were informed that they would be 
acting as managers of a hog production facility with a goal to maximize their economic 
return by balancing two factors: costs associated with implementing biosecurity practices 
and costs for any losses caused by the existence of the disease on their simulated facility. 
No specific disease was named, but participants were told that disease transmission was 
airborne. The University of Vermont Institutional Review Board approved this project 
and all protocols were followed for an experiment using human participants. 
 6 
 
Experimental Game Design 
To approach a reasonable, and yet realistic blend of risk and reward, we created an 
experiment that manufactured a conflict between the economics of investing in 
biosecurity and expected loss in the case of facility infections that could be more 
reflective of a relatively low impact disease, such as porcine respiratory and reproductive 
syndrome during an outbreak.  
The experimental game was written in the R computer language [33] and was 
played on Microsoft Surface Pro Tablets [34] with touch screen capacity. Game code can 
be found in Supporting Information Appendix 1 (S1 Appendix). The experimental game 
simulated a landscape of fifty hog production facilities, each producing 2500 hogs when 
they are disease-free (Fig 1). Facilities were randomly located on a 17 by 15 gridded 
landscape, with the participant operating one production facility randomly selected from 
one of the 30 centermost possible locations on the grid. That is, the participant’s facility 
was centrally located by design. Facility locations were important because distance 
between facilities was a factor determining disease spread between facilities. 
 
Fig. 1. Protocol adoption screen capture one. A screen capture from the 
Protocol Adoption game showing a map of participant’s facility (outlined by blue 
diamond), 49 other simulation controlled facilities in the region, the scenario (or 
round) month, each facility’s biosecurity adoption level and disease status, and 
the four possible actions available to the participant. 
 
A blue triangle was used to indicate the participant’s facility (Fig 1). The 
remaining 49 facilities were termed “simulation-controlled facilities.” All facilities were 
shown as circles, the color of which indicated its disease status (black = no disease; red = 
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disease present; gray = disease status unknown). Next to each circle was a square that 
indicated the facility’s biosecurity level (i.e., none, low, medium, high, or unknown, 
ranging from dark brown to dark green, respectively).  
Participants each played 18 treatment rounds. Each round consisted of 11 
biosecurity adoption decisions, simulating monthly decisions from February through 
December of a single year. In each month, participants made an investment decision 
regarding biosecurity at their facility. Participants could choose “no action” or they could 
invest in biosecurity. Only one investment could be made per month. Level 0 was the 
initial starting point with no biosecurity implemented (0% reduction in the probability of 
acquiring an infection). Increasing biosecurity to Level 1 by investing in a Disease 
Management Protocol reduced the probability of infection by 10%. Increasing biosecurity 
to Level 2 by investing in a Cleaning and Disinfecting Protocol reduced the probability of 
infection by 40%. Increasing biosecurity to Level 3 by investing in a Shower in/Shower 
out Protocol reduced the probability of infection by 90%. Even with the maximum 
biosecurity adopted by the participant (Level 3), their facility’s hogs could still become 
infected, which reflects realistic conditions. Participants were told that a 0 value equated 
to a Protection Level of “none” and a Protection Level 3 was “high” and were informed 
that increasing biosecurity by adopting new practices would decrease the probability that 
their animals would acquire a disease, but they were not informed of the efficacy of each 
biosecurity practice adoption. Once Level 3 biosecurity was reached, no more choices 
(except “No Action”) were available. Also, if the participant’s facility became infected, 
no more choices (except “No Action”) were advised because investing additional funds in 
biosecurity would not alter their current infection status. Making their choice took 
participants to either the next month in the current round or, if the month was December, 
to the next round. Before starting the 18 treatment rounds, participants played two 
practice rounds. Play during the treatment rounds contributed to the participants’ 
experimental earnings or losses, and generated data that were subsequently analyzed. To 
reduce the effect of the order of play and any strategic learning that occurred during game 
play, the 18 treatment scenarios were randomized.  
 
Social and Environmental Uncertainty Treatments 
As an experimental study, the game included two types of treatments designed to 
represent a change in information sharing that would inform perceptions of uncertainty in 
two domains: environmental uncertainty and social uncertainty. Each of the two 
uncertainty treatments had three levels: 1) no information sharing, high uncertainty, 2) 
partial information sharing, moderate uncertainty, and 3) complete information sharing, 
low uncertainty. There were three social uncertainty treatments and three environmental 
uncertainty treatments, comprising nine treatment combinations. Each treatment 
combination was played twice with biosecurity practices at the simulation-controlled 
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facilities selected by stochastically sampling from each of two different distributions 
(Table 1). The distribution sets were as follows:  
1) Type 1 (High): a distribution with a mean biosecurity level of 2.51. Biosecurity 
levels for all simulation-controlled facilities were sampled from the set [Level 0, 
Level 1, Level 2, and Level 3] with respective probabilities of [0.02, 0.05, 0.33, 
and 0.60]. 
2) Type 2 (Low): a distribution with a mean biosecurity level of 0.49. Biosecurity 
levels for all simulation-controlled facilities were obtained by sampling from the 
set [Level 0, Level 1, Level 2, and Level 3] with respective probabilities of [0.60, 
0.33, .05, and 0.02]. 
Table 1. Treatment Table.  
  
Degrees of Environmental Uncertainty: 
Information sharing of disease incidence in 
the simulation-controlled facilities 
  Complete Partial None 
Degrees of Social 
Uncertainty: Information 
sharing of biosecurity 
levels in the simulation-
controlled facilities 
Complete High/Low High/Low High/Low 
Partial High/Low High/Low High/Low 
None High/Low High/Low High/Low 
 
All participants played 18 experimental scenarios: three environmental uncertainty 
treatments, three social uncertainty treatments, and two distributions of simulation-
controlled biosecurity practices (simulation-controlled facilities with relatively high 
biosecurity practices and simulation-controlled facilities with relatively low biosecurity 
practices) (Table1). 
In the screen shot shown in Fig 2, for example, disease incidence information was 
not shared with participants, but information about biosecurity practices was completely 
shared. In this case, biosecurity levels were selected from the Type 1, high biosecurity 
practice distribution (i.e., most simulation controlled facilities had good to great 
biosecurity practices in place).  
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Fig. 2. Protocol adoption screen capture two. A screen capture depicting a 
round with no disease incidence information sharing, complete biosecurity level 
information sharing, and Type 1 or high biosecurity at simulation-controlled 
facilities.  
 
Additional Experimental Game Details 
Disease transmission and probability of infection 
Described to the participants as an airborne disease, transmission of disease between all 
facilities (simulation-controlled and participant-controlled) was a stochastic, probabilistic 
event with disease spread quantified using a function of distance between facilities and 
the level of biosecurity protocols adopted by each facility. With a fixed contagion rate, 
the calculation of the probability of acquiring a new infection at each facility for each 
time step becomes:  
 
1 − β𝑖 ∗∏(1 −
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗
𝑖
) 
for each facility i given infected facility j. 
 
Where β𝑖 was the biosecurity effect at facility i. This calculation provided a single 
infection probability value for each facility. A random number was then generated and if 
the random number was lower than the calculated probability value then the facility 
became infected. We used a contagion value of 25. With this contagion value, and no 
biosecurity adopted by the participant, approximately 75% of rounds with Type 1 
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biosecurity resulted in an infection at the participant’s site, and approximately 15% of 
rounds with Type 2 biosecurity resulted in an infected site.  
At the start of each round, there was a 70% probability of a single infection 
somewhere among the simulation-controlled facilities. We did not allow the participant’s 
facility to be initialized with an infection, and thus, the participant’s facility could not be 
infected before the participant had had a chance to make a biosecurity practice adoption 
decision. Additionally, each month there was a 10% chance of a new infection appearing 
in one of the simulation-controlled facilities.  
Investment economics  
Participants could expect to receive $35,000 experimental dollars minus biosecurity 
investment costs in gross profit from selling their hogs at the end of the year if hogs were 
healthy. Monte Carlo simulations were used to generate simulated game play metadata to 
provide bounds for the range of outcomes that could result from participant decisions. 
Treatments were each run 80,000 times with stochastic values for infection location and 
simulation-controlled facility biosecurity levels. When no biosecurity investment was 
made by the participant, Monte Carlo results indicated that infections would occur at the 
participant’s facility in 31.2% of the scenarios. Gross losses with an infection event were 
variable but averaged $31,194 experimental dollars. Participants were not told in advance 
the specific loss they would incur with an infection; rather they were provided an 
example plus the knowledge that exact losses would depend upon how much of their herd 
was killed by the disease. Thus, participants were aware that losses would be significant 
and that they would likely range from around $30,000 to $35,000 experimental dollars. 
Each incremental increase in biosecurity costs $10,000 experimental dollars, with a 
maximum investment of $30,000 experimental dollars.  
Relationship between investment decisions, game play and cash payout 
Experimental dollars accrued over the course of the 18 experimental rounds played by 
each participant. At the end of the game, experimental dollars were converted to real US$ 
at a rate of $12,000 experimental dollars to $1 US dollar. Participants were paid in cash 
upon completion of the study. Participants were aware from the outset that their game 
performance would determine their cash payout, incentivizing them to make decisions 
that maximized their payout.  
Additional factors that may influence biosecurity adoption behavior 
Behavior in an experimental game situation may be influenced by numerous factors, 
which were controlled for using the following covariates:  
Temporal discounting: Psychological distance from an event impacts the perceived value 
of an event. One example of psychological distance is temporal discounting, which 
suggests that the value of past or future losses or gains diminishes with increased 
temporal distance [16, 35, 36]. Because past events are increasingly discounted with 
temporal distance, we hypothesize that perception of the probability of a future infection 
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event will decrease as time increases since an observation of a past infection event. 
Specifically, that response effect size, measured by investment in biosecurity, will 
diminish with time (number of rounds of play) since an infection occurred. 
Order Effect: While treatment order effect was minimized by randomly selecting the 
treatment order, participants could change their strategy in a predictable way as the game 
progressed creating a learning-order effect [37-39]. For example, on average, participants 
may decrease their adoption of biosecurity practices as the number of rounds increases 
because the economic return, all other things being equal, favors non-investment 
strategies.  
Observed Biosecurity Level: Observed Biosecurity Level at simulation-controlled 
facilities (categorical: Type 1 high biosecurity, Type 2 low biosecurity, or unknown 
biosecurity) may affect choice of whether to implement biosecurity.  
Observed Probability of Infection: We assume some correlation between actual risk of 
infection based on information available to the participants and their game play. 
Specifically, as the observable risk increases (e.g., facilities close to the participant’s 
facility become infected), participants should increase their investment in biosecurity. We 
recognize that substantial variation exists between perceived risk and actual risk, and that 
perceived risk can be discordant with actual risk. Yet, we anticipated that increases in the 
actual probability of infection at their facility will correlate with increased investment in 
biosecurity by the participant.  
Dependent variable calculation 
An index variable derived from game data was created that integrates timing and 
biosecurity practice adoption. The index variable was percent of the maximum amount of 
biosecurity investment by month, or percent maximum biosecurity (PMB). PMB was 
calculated by summing biosecurity level by month and dividing it by the sum of the 
maximum biosecurity investment by month. For example, after the third decision month, 
if a participant’s decisions indicated biosecurity levels of 0, 1, and 2, this would sum to 3. 
The maximum biosecurity investment possible would be 1, 2, 3, for a sum of 6. Thus, the 
PMB for the third decision month would be 0.50. Because we were interested in the 
decision-making process, we viewed PMB data as being informative only when it was 
possible for participants to make relevant decisions. Relevance could cease under two 
conditions: 1) when the maximum biosecurity level has been reached or 2) when the 
facility has become infected. PMB for the month with the last possible decision (The Last 
Decision Month) was used as the dependent variable in our analysis. PMB was used as an 
index of biosecurity investment effort because higher PMB values are found with a 
combination of early and high investment in biosecurity.  Last Decision Month is 
triggered by either reaching the maximum biosecurity level, or by becoming infected. If 
participants have not maximized their biosecurity level at the end of the round, they 
received a Last Decision Month value of 13. If Observed Probability of Infection was 
high, participants may have reached their last decision month sooner by either 
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maximizing biosecurity at their facility or becoming infected. Conversely, if Observed 
Probability of Infection were low, participants may opt not to invest in biosecurity, 
resulting in a low PMB. Participants are likely to have an earlier (smaller) last decision 
month in scenarios with higher perceived or actual risk.  
Data Analysis 
Mixed effects linear regression models were used to examine effects of uncertainty 
treatments and noted covariates. Four mixed effects candidate models were developed to 
examine the dependent variable, PMB [R version 3.2.0, 33]. Model selection was 
conducted by selecting the model with the lowest Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) 
value [40, 41]. Using the AIC-selected best candidate model, p-values for main effects 
and interactions were calculated by using Likelihood Ratio Tests [33].  
Population distribution analysis. Environmental and social uncertainty 
treatments 
We analyzed data to examine potential differences between behavioral strategies when 
confronted with environmental and social uncertainty treatments. Using the selected best 
candidate model, we generated PMB predictions for each participant for each treatment 
scenario. Predicted values from the model were then binned by treatment scenario. The 
binned data were examined as input distributions for two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
tests [33]. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests quantified the probability that each pair of 
non-parametric distributions (data from treatment scenario bins) were generated from a 
single unknown distribution [42].  
Individual differences. Cluster analyses.  
Our methodology allows us to look beyond distribution shifts in behavior to examine 
how individuals in the population responded to changes in uncertainty. Treatment effects 
look for population level changes in the distribution, whereas individual decisions may 
contrast with the mean population decisions. We used model prediction data for each 
treatment for each participant to look for individual responses. Because information 
sharing is not an industry standard, we define moving from high uncertainty to low 
uncertainty to be an intervention. Individuals that are receptive to interventions by 
increasing investment in biosecurity were termed intervention receptive., Those that did 
not change their biosecurity investment behavior based on an intervention  were termed 
intervention neutral. Finally, those that react negatively to information sharing 
interventions, and thus reduce their investment in biosecurity were termed intervention 
averse. We used k-means clustering [33] to bin participants into intervention-response 
groups labeled as intervention receptive, defined as those responding with greater than a 
10% increase in biosecurity investment effort (PMB), intervention neutral, defined as a 
minimal change in either direction (+/- 10% change in PMB), or intervention averse, 
defined as greater than a 10% reduction in biosecurity when confronted with scenarios 
 13 
 
that decreased uncertainty. The elbow technique was used to determine a parsimonious 
number of behavioral clusters [43].  
Results 
Participants (n = 110) took part in the study between February 2016 and July 2016. Of 
these, 54 identified as female, 52 identified as male, and four did not indicate their sex. 
Participants ranged in age from 18 – 58 (mean = 23.6). Game play, including the 
introductory framing slideshow, took approximately one hour. The average payout was 
$18.20, with a high of $40. Based on game play, many of the participants (61 out of the 
110) would have earned less than the research study’s minimum payout, so they received 
the guaranteed minimum $15 participation payment.  
Candidate Model Selection: Mixed effects linear regression models 
Of the four models examined, Model 3 was the AIC-selected, best candidate model and 
all inference was based on it (Table 2).  
 
Table 2. Mixed-effect linear regression candidate models.  
Model 
Random 
Variable 
EUT SUT PI LM OBL TD OE 
LM 
* 
PI 
EUT 
* 
SUT 
OBL 
* 
SUT 
AIC 
#1 Participant X X X X X X X X   -469.75 
#2 Participant X X X X X X X X X  
-467.28 
#3* Participant X X X X X X X X  X -472.33 
#4 Participant X X X X X X X X X X -470 
Fixed effects included the Environmental Uncertainty Treatment (EUT), Social 
Uncertainty Treatment (SUT), Observed Probability of Infection (PI), Last 
Decision Month or the last month where a decision was possible (LM), Observed 
Biosecurity Level (OBL), Scenarios completed since last infection (Temporal 
Discounting effect: TD), and round number (Order Effect: OE).  
*Akaike’s Information Criterion-selected best candidate model. 
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Table 3. Model 3 coefficient estimates, standard errors, and t-values 
Fixed Effect Estimate Std. Error t value 
Intercept 1.1405 0.0283 40.2330 
LM -0.0872 0.0028 -31.2230 
PI -1.5064 0.3545 -4.2490 
EUT (Partial) -0.0230 0.0114 -2.0120 
EUT (Complete) 0.0484 0.0129 3.7500 
SUT (Partial) -0.0022 0.0139 -0.1590 
SUT (Complete) -0.0490 0.0137 -3.5830 
Type 2 OBL 0.0111 0.0158 0.7030 
OE 0.0017 0.0009 1.8710 
TD -0.0026 0.0015 -1.7500 
LM*PI 0.2271 0.0384 5.9150 
SUT (Partial) * Type 2 OBL -0.0476 0.0222 -2.1410 
Random effects: Participant Variance: 0.0184, sd = 0.1355, residual Variance: 
0.040, sd = 0.201. Fixed effects included the Environmental Uncertainty 
Treatment (EUT), Social Uncertainty Treatment (SUT), Observed Probability of 
Infection (PI), Last Decision Month or the last month where a decision was 
possible (LM), Observed Biosecurity Level (OBL), Scenarios completed since 
last infection (Temporal Discounting effect: TD), and round number (Order 
Effect: OE).  
Population distribution analysis. Environmental and social uncertainty 
treatments 
Based on results from Model 3, both the environmental uncertainty ((1)=35.75, p < 
0.001) and social uncertainty ((2)=8.9265, p < 0.011) variables affect PMB (Table 3 
and Figs 3 & 4).  
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Fig. 3. PMB versus environmental uncertainty. This figure captures the 
observed increase in the percent maximum biosecurity (PMB) with increased 
information sharing and decreased environmental uncertainty associated with 
disease incidence.  
 
 
Fig. 4. PMB versus social uncertainty.  This figure captures the observed 
decrease in the percent maximum biosecurity (PMB) with increased information 
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sharing and decreased social uncertainty associated with biosecurity practice 
reporting.  
 
Table 4 shows differences in the distributions of participant behavior within-treatment 
using two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. The p-values indicate that it is unlikely 
that the distribution of the PMB values by treatment is derived from the same underlying 
process.   
 
Table 4. Results of Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests.  
 Environmental Uncertainty 
(Disease Incidence) 
Social Uncertainty  
(Biosecurity Practice)  
No I.S. (High Uncertainty) vs 
Partial I.S. (Moderate Uncertainty) 
D = 0.061717, p = 0.1621 
 
D = 0.11515, p < 0.001 
No I.S. (High Uncertainty) vs 
Complete I.S. (Low Uncertainty) 
D = 0.1663, p < 0.001 
 
D = 0.12668, p < 0.001 
 
Partial I.S. (Moderate Uncertainty) 
vs Complete I.S. (Low Uncertainty) 
D = 0.11364, p < 0.001 
 
D = 0.041298, p = 0.627 
 
Tests compare effects of information sharing (I.S.) on participants’ decisions by 
looking for differences in the distributions of participant behavior within the 
environmental uncertainty treatment and within the social uncertainty treatment. 
The null hypothesis is that behavioral distributions were drawn from the same 
unknown distribution [42]. 
 
Individual differences. Cluster analyses.  
K-means clustering identified six clusters of participant behavior in both the 
environmental and social uncertainty treatments using the elbow technique.  
Fig 5 describes results from the environmental uncertainty treatments, associated 
with disease incidence information sharing. Cluster analyses show that 38.2% of 
participants are intervention receptive depicted by those classified into Clusters 5 and 6 
with a 0.17 and a 0.34 respective PMB increase. A slightly larger percentage (41.8%) of 
participants are intervention neutral, Clusters 3 and 4, and do not change significantly (-
0.06 and 0.06 change in PMB respectively). Interestingly, approximately 20% of 
individuals, Clusters 1 and 2, are intervention averse, showing a decreased willingness to 
invest in biosecurity, which contrasts with the mean population effect of increased PMB 
(-0.27 and -0.17 change in PMB).  
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Fig. 5. Distribution of individual behavior when confronted by changes in 
environmental uncertainty. Individual behavior was segregated by observed 
change from high environmental uncertainty (no disease incidence information 
sharing) to low environmental uncertainty (complete disease incidence 
information sharing). While mean population trends suggest increased investment 
in biosecurity (Fig 3), not all participants followed that relationship. A positive 
change equates to increased biosecurity investment.  
 
Conversely, cluster analyses results from social uncertainty associated with 
biosecurity practice information sharing (Fig 6), show that only a small proportion of 
participants change against the observed mean population trend by increasing their 
biosecurity investment in response to increased sharing of biosecurity practice 
information. A small percentage (7.3%) of participants are intervention receptive 
depicted by those classified into a single cluster, Cluster 6 with a 0.19 PMB increase. 
Fifty percent of participants are intervention neutral, Clusters 4 and 5, and do not change 
significantly (-0.04 and 0.05 change in PMB respectively). A large proportion of 
individuals, 42.7%, Clusters 1, 2 and 3, are intervention averse, changing against the 
mean obesrved population trend of increased PMB (-0.27 and -0.18 and -0.13 change in 
PMB). 
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Fig. 6. Distribution of individual behavior when confronted by changes in 
social uncertainty. This figure marks individual differences between high social 
uncertainty (no biosecurity practice information sharing) treatments and low 
social uncertainty (complete biosecurity practice information sharing) treatments. 
While mean population trends suggest decreased investment in biosecurity (Fig 
4), not all participants followed that relationship. A positive change equates to 
increased biosecurity investment. There was weak evidence for a temporal 
discounting effect ((1)=3.012, p = 0.083 and effect size -0.0026). Specifically, 
experiencing an infection enhances the future perception of risk with participants, 
reducing the PMB by approximately a quarter of a percentage point every round 
since they were last infected.  
 
Based on results from Model 3, there was only weak evidence suggesting an order 
effect with participants increasing their PMB with increased within-game experience 
(Table 3. (1)=3.483, p = 0.062 and effect size = 0.0017).  
Simulation controlled facilities in each scenario were designed to either have 
relatively high biosecurity (Type 1: mean value observed by participants = 2.53) or 
relatively low biosecurity (Type 2: mean value observed = 0.46). There is weak evidence 
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((2)=5.7009, p = 0.0578) that participants are using the information presented by the 
level of observed biosecurity reported by simulation-controlled facilities, with more 
biosecurity investment observed with Type 2 (low) biosecurity than with Type 1 (high) 
biosecurity (Table 3). 
As expected, there is strong evidence that main effects of Last Decision Month 
and the Observed Probability of Infection and their interaction had a positive effect on 
PMB ((3)=1234.8, p < 0.001). The main effects of Last Decision Month (effect size = -
0.0872), and Observed Probability of Infection (effect size = -1.5064) and their 
interaction term (effect size = 0.2271) can be suitably explained by considering of how 
last decision month is calculated.  
Discussion 
We sought to provide insight that will allow policy makers to influence behavior in this 
social-ecological system towards a more resilient system [44]. Yet, influencing human 
behavior is complex. One approach is to seek insight into how people might react to 
disease threats contextualized in the livestock biosecurity arena. Understanding 
typologies of risk and uncertainty perceptions and decision-making behavior could allow 
for the “nudging” of human behavior towards resilience. Characteristics of typologies 
may provide opportunities for better understanding of biosecurity perception including 
opportunities to increase general awareness and risk acceptance, and improved producer 
decision-making behavior.  
Studies that examine behavioral economics and decision-making frequently select 
participants from a subset of society, such as a student population. However, these 
subsets may differ from the population of interest, which carries the potential for bias. 
And thus, one potential limitation of our findings is that participants in our study were not 
pre-selected based on knowledge of the industry. Decision-making behavior in the study 
may differ from stakeholders with extensive experience in the swine industry. For 
example, U.S. farmers are thought to be less risk averse than the public and much of the 
discussed risk stemmed from environmental uncertainty [45]. Conversely, Zia et al. [46], 
using a similar experimental game methodology in the swine industry, did not find a 
significant difference between swine industry stakeholders and behavior of an audience 
that was not pre-selected based on experience in the industry. Thus, because the swine 
production system is complex and decision-makers each have their own set of objectives, 
any bias that exists may not be consistent.  
Social and environmental uncertainty 
Uncertainty aversion theory suggests that in general people will lean towards herd 
protection, and thus invest more in biosecurity than would be economically optimal in 
order “to be safe” [17, 31, 47]. Our finding of increased risk mitigation, through 
investment in biosecurity, with increased social uncertainty generally confirms much of 
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the existing literature [18, 20, 31, 47-49]. While removing social uncertainty through 
sharing information about biosecurity practices may superficially appear to emerge from 
participant use of a free-rider strategy, the decrease in biosecurity with reduced social 
uncertainty exists even when simulation-controlled facilities have very low biosecurity in 
place (Type 2 biosecurity practice distribution). Thus, simulation-controlled facilities did 
not provide protection to the wider system, and by inference, the participant, which 
invalidates the notion that participants were solely relying on a free-rider strategy.  
Contrary to the social uncertainty findings, increased environmental uncertainty 
(e.g. less information about disease prevalence) was correlated with decreased biosecurity 
investment. Brashers and Hogan [50] argue that in some situations, reduction in 
uncertainty can produce anxiety, and thus generate a perverse response to uncertainty. 
Thus, an alternative explanation for our results is that participants were responding with 
uncertainty preference, optimism or wishful thinking to the environmental uncertainty 
[17, 22, 49-51]. Gangadharan and Nemes [22] suggest that subjects may underestimate 
the probability of a negative event if event avoidance is the desired outcome. This would 
suggest that participants may reduce their investment in biosecurity with increased 
environmental uncertainty because of some bias that allows for a belief that the negative 
effect is unlikely to happen to them. One possibility is that perceptions of disease 
incidence are weighted towards an optimistic belief that facilities were uninfected if no 
information is provided. That is, the optimistic perception may be that disease is 
relatively unlikely, and thus, a default hope is that simulation-controlled facilities are 
likely to be disease-free. Our findings would suggest that participants held onto an 
optimistic perception that unknown status of others’ facilities implied healthy facilities. 
While we hypothesized differences between social and environmental uncertainty, 
previous research did not lead us to expect that parsing of uncertainty into response 
behavior associated with social uncertainty and environmental uncertainty would elicit 
diametric biosecurity investment responses. Loewenstein et al. [20] found behavioral 
distinction between decisions made under social uncertainty compared with 
environmental uncertainty situations. Their results showed large effect size changes, yet 
relationships between social and environmental uncertainty treatments remained similar, 
showing uncertainty aversion throughout their experiments, and thus unlike our results, 
did not observe uncertainty preference in any of their treatments. We encourage future 
research to extend the understanding of uncertainty aversion by determining the role of 
the uncertainty context on decision-making behavior.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, participant’s investment in biosecurity increased as the 
observable risk of infection increased at a participant’s facility, such as when a 
neighboring facility became infected. The timing of this increased risk was also 
important, with increased risk towards the end of a round less likely to promote 
investment than the same risk early in the round. This suggests that most individuals were 
responding appropriately to increased relative risk of infection in their environment 
 21 
 
because a relatively small risk will compound from early scenarios to late scenarios 
possibly resulting in a high probability of infection, whereas the same small risk in a late 
round will result in a relatively small probability of infection by the end of the round.  
There was weak evidence for a temporal discounting effect. In general, 
participants responded to an infection with an initial increase in biosecurity investment 
followed by a gradual decline. Evidence for a temporal discounting effect is supported by 
the literature [35, 36, 52] and has been observed in food animal industries, such as the 
poultry industry, with heightened biosecurity during an outbreak and just subsequent to 
outbreaks.  
Variability associated with the play order effect was controlled using a learning 
effect variable. Participants became increasingly risk averse as the game progressed, 
possibly associated with loss aversion as their experimental dollars accrued [53, 54].  
Overall, results provide suggested direction for policy makers and the 
development of new interventions, yet, a conservative approach to altering policy may be 
warranted. Our participants, while recruited from the public, likely did not have 
experience in the swine industry, and thus, may differ behaviorally from those working 
with hogs. Moreover, we created an elevated risk of infection to create a conflict 
requiring action: Experimental dollars were reflective of reality as far as expected profit 
per hog, yet did not accurately represent the time requirements for raising a hog, the costs 
for implementing new biosecurity practices, upkeep of biosecurity practices, or the 
expected loss if a disease were acquired at a hog production facility. Reality appears to 
reflect a much lower chance of infection, with a much higher cost when an infection 
occurs, inclusive of the possibility of loss of livelihood [1], a set of contextual factors that 
can be studied in future iteration of the experimental game.  
Conclusion 
With these results, we gain further understanding that increased communication and 
sharing of information might not always result in increased biosecurity. Rather, 
communication strategies must be designed thoughtfully and with careful audience 
analysis. Insight into uncertainty, risk and the importance of their context should provoke 
discussions about the ramifications of potential interventions, with the hope that well-
considered interventions will generate measurable change in biosecurity attitudes and 
intent of stakeholders. Our findings challenge the assertion that simply increasing the 
communication of information regarding biosecurity strategy and implementation in the 
industry will result in increased investment in biosecurity. Willingness to invest in 
heightened biosecurity increases with increased awareness of disease incidence in the 
system, but decreases with increased awareness of biosecurity practices in place at nearby 
facilities. Thus, recommendations designed to nudge behavior towards a more biosecure 
industry require an understanding that response to an intervention that decreases 
uncertainty of disease prevalence may be more effective than decreasing uncertainty of 
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biosecurity strategy adoption. Our results suggest that policy makers aiming to enhance 
industry biosecurity may be successful by communicating the incidences of diseases and 
infection outbreaks to livestock owners/managers. In contrast, dissemination of 
information about biosecurity practices used at other facilities should not be actively 
encouraged, because these results suggest that information sharing in this domain may 
result in decreased investment in biosecurity.  
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